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We study achievable secret key rates for the Bennett-Brassard-84 (BB84) quantum key distribu-
tion protocol with one way classical post-processing. Specifically, we characterize the performance of
a family of error correcting codes when used in the information reconciliation phase of BB84. When
combined with noisy processing, these codes allow secure key to be established for quantum bit error
rates up to 0.129. This improvement over the previous best noise threshold of 0.124 illustrates, in
contrast to the classical scenario, a marked advantage of structured codes over random codes when
used for quantum key distribution. Our results are intimately connected to degenerate quantum
codes, which we briefly discuss.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two parties
using public channels to remotely establish a secret key
whose security is not predicated on the difficulty of some
computational task. Rather, the security of the key gen-
erated by a QKD protocol depends only on fundamental
laws of physics. As a result there has been an enormous
amount of work on practical and theoretical aspects of
QKD, and a corresponding rapid progress in both [1].
The first QKD protocol was proposed by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 [2], and like all QKD schemes, it is based
on the tradeoff between information gain and disturbance
in quantum mechanics. To establish a bit of raw key, the
sender (Alice) encodes a random bit into one of two con-
jugate bases (X or Z), chosen at random, and transmits
it to a receiver (Bob). Bob measures in either the X or
Z basis, also chosen at random. After generating a large
number of bits(say, 2n), Alice and Bob can sift out the
bits for which they both chose the same basis by public
discussion, leaving roughly n bits.
Alice then randomly permutes her remaining bits and
announces the permutation to Bob, after which they per-
form parameter estimation by comparing a small fraction
of their bits to determine the error rate of the sifted key.
If the fraction p of bits on which Alice and Bob’s strings
disagree is sufficiently small, they proceed with informa-
tion reconciliation and privacy amplification to finally ar-
rive at a secret key. Otherwise they abort the protocol.
The essence of the protocol is that if an eavesdropper Eve,
who is assumed to have control of the quantum channel,
examines the signals in order to determine the key, she
will necessarily cause some disturbance which manifests
itself as errors in the sifted key. Thus p also character-
izes how much information an eavesdropper could have
gained about the key.
An important property of any QKD protocol is the
amount of noise that can be tolerated without compro-
mising the privacy of the resulting key, the amount of
noise at which the protocol aborts. The entanglement-
based security proof of Shor and Preskill [3] showed that
BB84 can be used to generate private key for detected er-
ror rates as high as p ≈ 0.11, basically by showing there
exist Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) [4, 5] codes correct-
ing noise up to this level. Remarkably, it was recently
found [6, 7] that this can be improved to p ≈ 0.124 if
Alice adds independent noise to her sifted key before per-
forming the distillation steps, which has been conjectured
to be optimal [7].
In the following, we increase this threshold to p ≈ 0.129
by finding improved error correcting codes for the in-
formation reconciliation phase. This family of codes is
highly structured and its improvement over the 0.124
threshold, which is the threshold for randomly chosen
codes, should be contrasted with the optimality of un-
structured random codes in classical key distillation.
Taken together, our information reconciliation and pri-
vacy amplification steps can be described by a highly
degenerate CSS code. A quantum code is called degener-
ate if its syndrome does not uniquely identify the errors
which it corrects. This is a uniquely quantum effect—
there is no such thing as a degenerate classical code—and
there are many unanswered questions about such codes.
However, it is known that in many cases degenerate codes
are strictly necessary to achieve the capacity of very noisy
channels [8, 9, 10].
Degenerate codes have been used for quantum key dis-
tribution before; in particular, in improving the threshold
of the six-state protocol from 12.6 to 12.7 percent [11].
However, this protocol did not involve noisy processing,
and in fact an even better threshold was obtained for the
six-state protocol by [6, 7]. Our result combines the use
of degenerate codes with noisy processing, leading to an
advantage over [6, 7] that is analogous to the improve-
ment of degenerate codes over random stabilizer codes
found in [8, 9, 10] for quantum communication over noisy
channels.
Analytic key rate expression—To determine the secret
key generation rate of the modified protocol, we follow
the proof method outlined in [6, 7, 12]. First, the prepare
& measure protocol can be converted to an equivalent
scheme in which Alice prepares the maximally-entangled
2state |Φ+〉⊗mnAB and sends half to Bob. Each party then
randomly and independently measures either X or Z on
each signal, saving the outcomes for use in parameter
estimation and key generation. They first discard the
outcomes for which their basis choice did not agree, and
denoting the remaining outcomes KA and KB, respec-
tively, it then follows from Corollary 6.5.2 of [12] that
for any m-bit processing step KmA → U and U → V it
is possible to use standard (i.e., unstructured, random)
error correction and privacy amplification to distill secret







S(U |V Em)− S(U |V KmB )
]
, (1)
evaluated on the state generated by performing the pro-
cessing on σ⊗mAB , and where Γp is the set of single pair
Bell-diagonal states σAB passing the parameter estima-
tion phase of the protocol and Em is the purification of
σ⊗mAB , which we must assume belongs to Eve. This ex-
pression is similar to what was found in [6, 7], with the
additional feature that it includes blockwise processing.
Since the X and Z bases are randomly used to create the
sifted key, the error estimation provides an estimate of
the bit- and phase-flip noise rates, so that the allowable
σAB are of the form σAB = (1 + t− 2p)|Φ+〉〈Φ+| + (p−
t)(|Φ−〉〈Φ−|+ |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|) + t|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| for t ∈ [0, p].
In the following, we will choose a particular KmA →
U → V for which the rate of Eq. (1) outperforms all pre-
viously known protocols for large p. The measurements
leading to KA and KB will be the same as for the usual
BB84 protocol, with the processing step chosen as fol-
lows. For each m bit block of KA, (x1, x2, . . . , xm), Alice
independently flips each bit with probability q, resulting
in x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜m). She then computes U = (x˜1, x˜1 ⊕
x˜2, . . . , x˜1⊕ x˜m) and sends V = (x˜1⊕ x˜2, . . . , x˜1⊕ x˜m) to
Bob, after which they proceed with error correction and
privacy amplification as usual. The key rate they achieve
is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The key rate achieved using the processing
x → U → V with U = (x˜1, x˜1 ⊕ x˜2, . . . , x˜1 ⊕ x˜m), V =
(x˜1⊕x˜2, . . . , x˜1⊕x˜m), where x˜ = x⊕f and f is a string of
independent 0-1 random variables, each with probability
























Here ρp,q = (1 − q)|ϕ+〉〈ϕ+| + q|ϕ−〉〈ϕ−| with |ϕ±〉 =√
1− p|0〉±√p|1〉, p˜ = p(1−q)+q(1−p), while P p˜m(u, s)
is defined in Lemma 2. The von Neumann entropy of a
quantum state is given by S(ρ) = −Tr ρ log ρ, while the
Shannon entropy of a classical probability distribution is
given by H(P ) = −∑l Pl logPl.
The proof proceeds by noting that in the entanglement
picture, our processing step is equivalent to Alice first
adding independent bit errors to her halves of the noisy
EPR pairs, measuring the stabilizers of an m qubit repe-
tition code, and then sending her syndrome outcomes to
Bob. We then apply the following lemma, which follows
from [10].
Lemma 2 The m qubit repetition code with stabilizers
Z1Z2, . . . , Z1Zm maps the error X
uZv to the logical error
Xu1Z⊕
m
l=1vl and syndrome s = (u1 ⊕ u2, . . . u1 ⊕ um).
When used to correct independent bit errors of probability
p, the probability of a logical bit error u and syndrome s
is given by
P pm(u, s) =
(
pm−s(1− p)s)u (ps(1− p)m−s)1−u , (3)
for s = |s|.


















|u|(1 − p)m−|u|, for
measured bit error rate p, and similarly for pv.
Alice adds independent noise at error rate q to the A




puvqf |f〉A′XuBZvBX fB|Φ+〉⊗mAB |u〉E1 |v〉E2 , (5)
where we have used the fact that XA ⊗ I|Φ+〉AB = I ⊗
XB|Φ+〉AB. Note that Eve’s system is determined by the
fact that in the worst case she holds the purification of
the state after it emerges from the channel. However, she
does not hold the purification of the noise Alice adds.
Alice and Bob then measure the stabilizers of the m-
qubit repetition code (Z1Z2, . . . Z1Zm) and Alice sends
her outcomes to Bob. This is equivalent to the case
where Bob defers his measurement until he receives Al-
ice’s message and then coherently corrects his key bit,
which we will consider here. Renaming Bob’s m− 1 syn-








⊗|su,f 〉B′ |u〉E1ZfE2 |v〉E2 ,
where su,f is an (m−1)-bit string labeling the basis states
of B′ whose jth bit is (su,f )j = u1 ⊕ uj+1 ⊕ f1 ⊕ fj+1.
Note that the Zf acting on Eve’s second system comes
from the commutation of ZvB and X
f
B.
Getting rid of the A′ system (but keeping it from Eve),
we now let Alice and Bob measure systems A and BB′
in the computational basis, respectively. According to
3Eq. (1), the difference of conditional entropies for the
resulting state will give us the key rate. This will be






The first term, I(A;BB′), is the mutual information of

















P p˜m(u|s)|x+u〉〈x+u|B ⊗ |s〉〈s|B′ ,(8)
and the P p˜m(u, s) are given by Lemma 2. From this, we





m(u|s)). Notice that this term only
depends on pu, which is determined by the parameter
estimation phase, so it will be the same for all σAB ∈ Γp.
Turning to the second term in Eq. (7), we want to


















(Z⊗mE2 )x . (9)
Note that the (Z⊗mE2 )
x comes from the action of
Z⊕
m
l=1vl on system B. When Eve’s bit and phase er-
rors are independent, this expression can be further
simplified. Defining µ =
∑
u
pu|u〉〈u| and ρp,q =















Actually, we have to maximize I(A;E1E2) over all puv
corresponding to states in σAB ∈ Γp, but the largest
value is attained for independent phase and bit errors. In
particular, if Eve starts with the independent u,v state,





pu|v|u〉E3 |v〉E2〈v|E2 , (11)
then completely dephasing the E3 system, she can con-
struct a ρAE2E3 with the same mutual information as if
the errors were distributed according to pu|vpv. Since
mutual information cannot be increased by local opera-
tions, the independent noise state must have the largest
value. Moreover, as the E1 system is uncorrelated with
AE2, the mutual information between Alice and Eve can













Taking the difference between I(A;BB′) and I(A;E),
keeping in mind we must sendm qubits for eachm-block,
leads to the overall key rate of Eq. (2). ⊓⊔
Numerical evaluation of key rates— We would now
like to evaluate the key rate in Eq. (2) for particular
values of p, q, and m. The expression S(ρp,q) can be
easily calculated and the second term can be evaluated











, but it can be handled as fol-
lows. Due to the permutation-invariance of the state
ρ⊗mp,q , it can be compactly expressed as a direct sum of
states on the SU(2) irreducible representations (irreps).
Each irrep occurs with some degeneracy, giving rise to
a “permutation factor”, which by Schur’s lemma [13]
is maximally-mixed. Using the expression for multiple
copies of a general qubit mixed state from [14], which
describes the irreducible states of ρ⊗mp,q as a function of
its Bloch vector and doing the same for Z⊗mρ⊗mp,q Z
⊗m,











m up to several hundred.
In general, larger m allow us to get higher thresholds
with the optimal value of q ≈ 0.3 increasing slowly with
m (e.g., Figure 1). Choosing m=400 and q=0.32 allows
a nonzero key generation rate up p=.1292, but for larger
m the computation becomes quite slow.
Discussion— Given the pattern of improving thresh-
olds with larger repetition lengths, it is tempting to guess
that the best threshold within the family of codes we have
described will be when m → ∞ as q → 0.5. While we
have not yet been able to perform such an analysis, it
seems likely that an asymptotic analysis of our key rates
in the limit of large m would be tractable.
It is important to mention that the codes we have con-
sidered are highly restricted, and it is not at all clear that
their key rates should be optimal. One promising idea for
higher rates is to adapt the concatenation of repetition
codes in conjugate bases used in [9, 10] to the problem of
secret key generation, with the repetition code in the X









FIG. 1: Bit error rate p at which the key rate goes to zero
as a function of processing noise q when using various-sized
repetition codes in the BB84 protocol. The curves are, from
bottom to top, m = 1,m = 10, 20, . . . 100, illustrating the fact
that a longer repetition code allows a higher threshold. As m
is increased, the optimal q also grows. Taking m = 400 and
q = 0.32 gives our best threshold of 0.1292.
basis providing improved privacy amplification. A more
ambitious approach would be to develop new degener-
ate codes for this problem, perhaps designed using the
heuristic suggested in [10].
The one-way protocols we have presented bear a strik-
ing resemblance to two-way protocols using advantage
distillation [15]. In particular, an advantage distillation
protocol can be described as using a repetition code, with
Bob sending the syndromes back to Alice. Error cor-
rection and privacy amplification are then performed on
blocks for which no error is detected, while the blocks for
which an error is detected are thrown away. Notice that
without the back communication from Bob, Alice would
not know the syndromes, and thus be unable to discard
the blocks in which Bob had detected an error. Our find-
ings show that even in this case, when Alice is ignorant
of the syndromes, and thus unable to discard bad blocks,
there is still a benefit in using a repetition code. In a
sense, the repetition code works “better than expected”,
because it collapses many phase errors to a single logical
phase error, while still providing information about bit
errors. This benefit should also appear when the code is
used for advantage distillation with noisy processing.
As was pointed out in [16], one-way protocols with
noisy processing can be viewed quite naturally as distil-
lation protocols for the class of twisted EPR pairs [17].
In that work it was shown that noisy processing can be
interpreted as the deflection of Eve’s correlations away
from the sifted key into a “shield” system, which purifies
the noise added by Alice. This is analagous to the an-
cient martial art, jiu-jitsu [18], wherein one uses leverage
to deflect an attacker’s force away from oneself rather
than opposing it directly. Viewed in this way, the benefit
of a repetition code is that it allows us to combine the
“soft” approach of deflecting phase errors and the “hard”
approach of correcting bit errors – while learning about
bit errors that we must correct, we are simultaneously
decreasing Eve’s correlation with the key, reducing the
need for privacy amplification later.
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